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Usually, it is unwise for an author of a book even to attempt responding to a published critique of his/her book with a brief rebuttal. He/she is always on the defense, and cannot, therefore, avoid appearing defensive. An essay in the New York Review of Books recently described all such attempted rebuttals as an "ABM" : an Author's Big Mistake. (I can recall one rare, but notable, exception to this general caution. It is from the famous LeibnizClarke Correspondence, wherein Leibniz prudently responded to a lengthy and bitter critique by Clarke with but one statement: I J I deny the major premise." Anything more is likely to become an ABM.)
In the present case, the editors of Informal Logic have kindly requested that I respond to Richard Paul's review of my Critical Thinking and Education (N.Y., St. Martin Press, 1981) . And they have specifically asked that I not review this Review, but rather restrict myself to the 'I substantive philosophical differences between us". With this restriction in mind, therefore, I hope it becomes clear that my comments are not intended to rebut all of Paul's many charges. It is rather an attempt to uncover what I think he has gotten wrong, and to discuss the "substantive philosophical differences between us". Putting the ABM aside, my intent is light, not heat.
I will treat each of Paul's more substantive points in their order of appearance.
Paul's opening comment about my books asserts that I made several "foundational mistakes", and that these have "serious flaws in their theoretical underpinnings". Little doubt the book might contain some of this. But as I examine Paul's critique, I find less evidence of "mistakes" and "serious flaws" than of misunderstanding of my position and perhaps genuine disagreement.
The first, and perhaps most pervasive, "mistake" that Paul finds is that I supposedly subscribe to "a rarefied form of logical atomism". It is never quite clear to me what, precisely, Paul means by "logical atomism". His meaning clearly differs from what most philosophers understand by that phrase, namely, the basic language elements in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Nor is his meaning at all like Russell's meaning in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (1918) . Rather, Paul seems to be coining his own phrase which is apparently meant to refer to my view that not all knowledge and skills are cut from the same cloth. It is quite true that I defend the view that, for example, a critical mathematician possesses a kind of knowledge and skill that is different from a critical historian. And in general, different domains of knowledge have (more often than not) characteristically different patterns of reasoning and argument that are peculiar to themselves. This view, incidentally, is a well-trodden philosophical path which leads back to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, or to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, particularly the notion of different "language games". Thus, while my particular statement of my position may or may not contain certain errors, it is, I think, gross overstatement to claim that the view contains "serious flaws in its theoretical underpinnings", or that it consists of serious "foundational mistakes". Aristotle, Wittgenstein, and I (if you'll forgive me) may all be wrong of course, but if so, it is not as obvious as Paul seems to think.
The major philosophical differences that divide Paul and me seem to reside in his basic charge that my position is "atomistic", or "technological/specialist" as he sometimes calls it. However, it seems to me that this charge is based upon both a misinterpretation of my view, and also an honest disagreement. At times, I confess, I'm not sure which is which, but let me try to explain these differences as succinctly as I can.
Paul marshals two separate and distinguishable arguments to support his charge (or characterization) of my position as being "atomistic", or "technological/specialist". The first argument concerns my rejection of generalized reasoning skills, and the second reflects his observation that most problems are in fact "multicategorical" and not domain-specific. Both of these arguments, however, are simply two different ways of rejecting my general view that critical thinking and rationality are primarily domainspecific and context-dependent (therefore, they do not represent I I general reasoning skills," in Paul's desired sense). I will treat each of Paul's arguments in a moment, but I think there is a much larger problem that moderates our disagreement. This larger problem cannot be resolved here, but I think it important to recognize that it does exist and that it helps explain the nature of our disagreement.
As time goes on, it becomes increasingly clear to me that my differences with the Informal Logic Movement (I LM) generally, may have their roots in a fundamentally different conception of how logic and language are connected to thought. This fundamental difference amounts to nothing less than a Kuhn-type paradigm clash about the nature of these connections. Thus, we continue to talk past one another, like ships passing in the night, each failing to be persuaded by the other's arguments. This paradigm clash is between what I would call a Wittgensteinian view about the nature of logic, language and thought that stresses the semantic and pragmatic features of logic and the more typically North American view which stresses the formai, syntactical features of logic and reasoning. For Wittgenstein, logic inheres within language and speech acts themselves. For the logicist (or North American view) logic is an exogenous system of rules and principles into which language can be pluggedin as a variable. While Informal Logic is less mathematical, or less formal than formal logic, nonetheless it shares the same syntactic preoccupation with rules and principles of reasoning (of a weaker sort) that is so characteristic offormallogic proper. (Hence, the persistent talk abo'ut "theories of fallacy, / I "theories of reasoning," "theories of informal logic," etc., all of which seek generalizable canons of reasoning and argument in one form or other.) Wittgenstein, on the other hand, did not believe such canons of reasoning were forthcoming, because the locus of logic (not mathematical or formal, however) resides within the speech acts themselves. For Wittgenstein, you can no more separate the logic of a speech act from the act itself than you can separate all the thread from the cloth and still have the cloth. To the extent that this view might be true incidentally, it helps to explain the well known difficulties associated with trying to accurately portrait the true structure of real arguments with formal schemata-the more real the argument, the more difficult is the portrayal. Wittgenstein's view explains why this is so. I am not here trying to defend Wittgenstein, but merely trying to point out that when 'logic' and 'reasoning' are perceived from these fundamentally different points of view much confusion and misunderstanding is bound to ensue.
I The paradigm clash between Toulmin and Johnson is at its clearest in Johnson's discussion of Toulmin's key notion of a "warrant", which is intended to displace rules of' inference.
Johnson writes:
Of all the elements in Toulmin's schema, the warrant is the one I had the greatest problem understanding. The intuitive idea seems clear enough, but (as I will try to show) Toulmin's rather breezy style of exposition creates some of the confUSion. Then, too, this is the element that departs most radically from the trad itional schema, thereby forcing one to look at the structure of arguments in a different light. That takes some getting used to. (p. 21) Johnson also adds revealingly:
The problem is thorny enough to make one hanker for the rarified climes of formal log ic-almost! The "problem of understanding" which Johnson has with Toulmin's schema is, I submit, not simply a matter of incomplete comprehension that one might find between two informal logicians. It is, rather, a classic paradigm clash between two people who hold radically different views about the nature of the connection between logic, language, and thought. Such deep-rooted differences cannot be resolved by simply cleaning up a few terms like "warrant" or "ground", because these concepts have no equivalent meaning in the other paradigm. They are part of a different philosophical network.
I might say that I share Johnson's dissatisfaction with Toulmin's notion of "warrants"; it is woolly. However, I also share Toulmin's basic view about the nature of the connections between logic, language and thought (which is Wittgensteinian.) And this view, therefore, puts me in the other paradigm.
I think this difference helps to explain: (a) much of the deeper misunderstandings about my view, and (b) why my view seems to appear so a priori to some folks, including Richard Paul. It is interesting, incidentally, that in Great Britain, where the book was first published, my general position has been received with polite yawns, since it is there more or less commonplace. (This, of course, does not mean it is correct; but it does mean it is understood.) Enough, however, about this fundamental difference. It cannot be resolved here. But I think it important to recognize that it exists.
Back to Paul's two arguments as promised. The first, you will recall, has to do with my rejection of generalized reasoning skills, which Paul uses to support his general charge about my view being "atomistic" or "technological/specialist." With the possible exception of general intelligence (or I.Q.), I do deny generalized reasoning skills. Or, at least, we have not discovered any thus far (psychologists included). This rejection, however, does not entail nor suggest a "technological/specialist" view of human reasoning, as Paul implies. To say, as I do, that the various broad domains of human understanding (e.g. math, literature, science, morality) require different kinds of concepts, skills, and patterns of reasoning peculiar to themselves and not generalizable across domains, is not to insist that people must be "specialists," as such, in any particular area. It is, rather, to point out that the particular ingredients of rationality and critical thinking are less generic and more idiosyncratic than any single set of generalized reasoning skills can capture, namely, the so-called "critical thinking skills." On my view, to become rational one must come to understand the different logical, conceptual, and epistemic differences that obtain between the different kinds of questions and problems that there are (e.g. mathematical, scientific, philosophic, artistic, moral, etc.). When one clearly understands these logical differences, one comes to appreciate the different procedures (or methods) that might be appropriate for answering (and asking) questions in these domains. This, indeed, is precisely the kind of understanding which a liberal education attempts to provide. And it is a kind of understanding and preparation for critical thinking that I have repeatedly advocated in my book, and several other papers. Whatever else a liberal education is, it is not "technological/specialistic." Indeed, it is often criticized from some quarters (e.g. business) precisely because it does not provide enough specialized knowledge. It should not go unnoticed, by the way, that training in specific "reasoning skills" is far more specialized than anything that I could have advocated. Thus, the irony in the charge of "technological/specialist."
Paul argues that my rejection of generalized reasoning skills is a nonsequitur because, he argues, that it does not follow from the fact that thought requires a specific object "X" (to be thought about) that there are no generalized reasoning skills. To show how "bizarre" he· thinks this reasoning is, he attempts to draw analogies with general writing skills (or "composition" ,) and "general speaking skills" :
Likewise most would think bizarre someone who argued that because speech requires something specifiC spoken about, it, therefore, is senseless to set up general courses in speech and incoherent to talk of general speaking skills.
But let us be very clear about something. I am not engaged in an analysis of 'writing,' nor of 'speaking': I am engaged in an analysis of 'thinking,' which is an entirely different concept. It might make sense to talk about "general writing skills," and perhaps "general speaking skills," but it does not follow from this (as Paul implies) that it makes similar sense to talk of "general thinking skills. oppose general critical thinking courses, which are supposed to be about everything in general and nothing in particular. I see nothing particularly "bizarre" in this rejection-quite the contrary. The second argument Paul marshals to support his charge of "atomism" centres around the "multi-categorical" character of most real problems. Paul argues that because I hold rationality and critical thinking to be domain-or subject-specific (i.e. atomistic, or specialists, he calls it), I, therefore, cannot handle most real, or "everyday" problems, because such problems do not lie clearly in one domain or another, but in several at once. They are "multi-categorical." This is what I take to be the general thrust of his argument.
Let with respect to alcoholism. It is simply one of those many things which do not belong to one and only one category. But as soon as one raises a specific kind of question about it, then a specific kind of answer will be appropriate; and one will then have to draw upon the specific knowledge and understanding they have about that kind of question. Moreover, one kind of knowledge about things (like alcoholism) can often affect other bel iefs one has about it as well. For example, if you believed alcoholism to be a disease, then you might not view it as a sin. But all of these cross-influences, and multi-texturedness, does not gainsay the existence of categories through which we perceive, talk and think about things. Indeed, rational belief and action is often pr.edicated on seeing things from these different perspectives; and people are not born with these different perspectives; they must learn them. Again, this is what a liberal education attempts to provide.
While some concepts, then, fall into several categories, there are also important concepts which '!ire specific (or unique) to certain domains. For example, the notion of "moral obligation" belongs to ethics, just as "electro-magnatism" belongs to physics, and "chiaroscuro" to art, "deity" to religion, "essence" and "ontology" to philosophy, and "differential equation" to mathematics, etc. Thus, some problems and questions we might have are peculiar to specific domains and, Paul's Critique 51 therefore, require knowledge of these domains in order to say anything intelligent about them. Of course, one can have varying degrees of such knowledge. Thus one might be able to say and do some things within the domain but not others. One's abilities here are a function of one's knowledge in the domain. [1] Moreover, I want to stress two further points about this domain-specific knowledge. First, it is not simply esoteric or useless knowledge designed to serve the interests of academic specialists, but rather, education, as such, consists in introducing people to the fundamentals of this knowledge in order to increase their rational capacities. Second, very many (if not most) so-called "everyday problems" need to employ domain-specific knowledge of this sort, if the discussion is to move beyond a superficial level. Indeed, this is why the more perSistent "everyday problems" such as disarmament, pollution, pornography, etc. are not amenable to quick solutions. They require several different kinds of specific knowledge and judgment, and sometimes in considerable amount. A broad liberal education is simply the best that we can do to bring average citizens up to the task of making rational judgments about such problems. And even thiS, per force, will be incomplete and fallible. But it is likely to be our best bet. Considerations such as these are what prompted my comment that "in this age of increased special knowledge, there are few Renaissance men." It was not meant to suggest that all problems fall neatly into one specialist's domain or another, as Paul interprets it.
Two brief (and final) points about Paul's charge of "atomism" and knowledge domains. First, there have been 13 published reviews of my book to date, and Richard Paul's is the first to construe my view as specia lis tic (or atomistic). It has been quite clear to most readers that I call for a broad liberal education, and that this is not "atomistic." I think, therefore, that his misinterpretation of my position is more his own doing than it is mine. Second, Paul states in several places that a person's "world view," or knowledge "uberhaupt," plays a crucial role in their critical thinking capacities. I could not c;:tgree more. However, if Paul would take the time to examine seriously the ingredients of a person's "world view," I think he would find it composed of certain kinds of beliefs and knowledge structures (i.e. cognitive schemata) which is precisely what liberal education attempts to influence and enlighten. Thus, there is actually more agreement here than Paul seems comfortable to admit. I just don't think his continued use of the phrase "world view" adds anything different to what we are already familiar with -but I have no objection to the phrase:
Enough about the major philosophical differences between Paul's view and my own. There remains one niggling point which I will briefly comment upon here only because Paul devotes so much space to it, and I might seem remiss if I omitted it.
In the middle of Paul's review he charges me with presenting critiques of the work of Scriven, D'Angelo, Ennis, and Johnson and Blair which are "unfair," "unsympathetic," and "at times highly misleading." Clearly, I cannot go over all of this ground again without writing another book. But a few comments, at least, are in order. First, if I have been "unfair" to any of these writers, I hereby apologize for it. They may rest assured that any unfairness was unintentional. One does one's best. I might say, however, that I have had lengthy contact with both Scriven and D'Angelo since the book was published, and neither of them ever suggested that my treatment of them was unfair. Indeed, despite remalnlng differences over more technical matters, they have both thanked me for much of my critique. Johnson and Blair strongly disagree with my views about informal logic, but they have never written (nor said) that I was unfai r, nor seriously misrepresented their views.
Ennis, apparently, does think that I have been unfair to his view. But disagreement, which there is, does not amount to unfairness nor "misleading representation," as Paul charges. Ennis' so-called "range definition" remains an attempt at definition, nonetheless; and one which I find deficient for all the reasons which I provided. Its core ingredient consists in a list of "general reasoning skills" which I reject. Moreover, Ennis still clings to the idea that "general reasoning skills" should be taught in order to improve critical thinking. He reiterates this point again and again in several recent publications. I think he is wrong about this for all the reasons I have given in the book, here, and elsewhere. This disagreement is not "misrepresentation," but a bona fide difference of opinion.
With respect to Ennis leaving out any treatment of value judgments, and making that clear to his reader, I specifically discuss this point on p. 54 of my book. Indeed, I explicitly quote Ennis' own words explaining why he left it out; moreover, it does not appear in a footnote somewhere, but in the middle of the text itself. So there is no attempt at "misrepresentation" here. I then go on to point out that it is a serious omission because his "pragmatic dimension" of critical thinking necessarily requires making value judgments. I still think this is correct. But even if Paul (or perhaps Ennis) disagrees with this observation, it is not misrepresentation.
To conclude, I want to address two relatively minor, but interesting, comments of Paul's. The first comment appears in Paul's final, but lengthy, footnote. Here, Paul questions and criticizes the appropriateness of a book on critical thinking devoting an entire chapter to Edward de Bono's work on thinking. Paul makes several points: (1) de Bono does not explicitly treat critical thinking as most of us understand that phrase (rather, he treats "problem solving" and "creativity" more than anything else); (2) de Bono is not in the same theoretical league as Scriven, Ennis, et al.; and (3) perhaps de Bono was only included for his "celebrity." I must remind Richard Paul (and possibly the reader) that I consider myself a philosopher of education and I write from that perspective. Indeed, the title of my monograph is Critical Thinking and Education. Thus, whatever Richard Paul's particular theoretical pretences, it just happens to be the case that de Bono's thinking programs are widely used in schools throughout the world and, therefore, have direct educational relevance. Moreover, these programs are very commonly used in many schools as bona fide critical thinking programs. Thus, first, if I had not treated deBono at some length, educators (the major audience) would have found the omission indeed very strange; and, second, my purpose was to expose the inherent weaknesses in de Bono's programs for educators and philosophers alike. I still believe this needed to be done for educators, and this is the kind of contribution that philosophers of education often make. Interestingly, I have received several letters from ph i 10- given his reservation about de Bono's status, invited him to speak at his Sonoma conference on thinking, though I am happy that he did so.
The second minor point to be treated here relates, similarly, to Paul's apparent ignorance about developments in the field of philosophy of education proper. Paul quotes a statement of mine about education and schooling that he apparently finds so cockeyed that it doesn't even warrant a counterargument by him. He just confidently states that his reader will not be "comfortable" with it either. He quotes my saying "there is nothing in the logic of 'education' that requires that schools should engage in education" and "nothing contradictory in saying 'This is a fine school, and I recommend it to others, even though it does not engage in education.' " To Paul, such a locution sounds patently absurd; to me, it is almost trivially true. This conflict of opinion is a dramatic example of something which Harvey Siegel has drawn to people's attention in several recent papers, namely: that it "is high time that the Informal Logic Movement confront the philosophy of education." (See his "Educating Reason: Critical Thinking, Informal Logic and the Philosophy of Education" in the APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy, Special Issue on Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, SpringSummer, 1985, p. 10.) It is quite clear to Siegel, and myself, that the I LM continues to proceed along its high-profile path without the slightest knowledge of the more serious literature in the philosophy of education. To anyone who had read R.S. Peters or Paul Hirst, or Robert Dearden, or a number of contemporary American philosophers of education, they would immediately understand that 'schooling' and 'education' are conceptually different things, and neither one entails the other. There are ballet schools, barber schools, flight schools, and numerous other kinds of schools whose purpose is not education in the normal (or traditional) sense r but rather training of some kind. A highly trained barber may or may not be educated. In short, some schools are avowedly not in the business of producing "educated people." They are teaching something else, e.g., different job skills, etc. The purpose of schools in many Third-World countries is to teach improved agricultural skills, road-building, hygiene, and the like r perhaps so that they might eventually have the luxury of educating their populations in the more traditional sense. What schools are for is a social decision which varies from place to place r and sometimes from school to school. Thus, there is nothing particularly strange, nor contradictory, in my saying "there is nothing in the logic of 'education' that requires that schools should engage in 'education'." Much goes on in schools which has nothing to do with 'education,' as such; and conversely, much 'education' (e.g. self-education) does not take place in schools. Philosophers of education know this.
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